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BOOK REVIEWS

VALUABLE LESSONS FOR THE LEADERS OF TODAY
Husted, Stewart W. George C. Marshall: Rubrics of Leadership. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College
Foundation, 2006. 259pp. $23.95

In recent years a veritable avalanche of
monographs and manuscripts has examined corporate and military leadership. Recognizing the need for a book
about leaders of character, Stewart
Husted selected as his model one of
America’s most admired figures, General George C. Marshall. This work examines Marshall’s leadership and its
impact on the world throughout his career as a military officer, Army chief of
staff during World War II, secretary of
state, and secretary of defense.
Husted is hardly a stranger to the study
of General Marshall. He is a former
business school dean, a retired U.S.
Army Reserve officer, and the inaugural
John and Jane Roberts Chair in Free
Enterprise Business at the Virginia Military Institute, Marshall’s alma mater.
Writing primarily for the military market, Husted draws heavily upon historian
Forrest Pogue’s masterful four-volume
biography of Marshall, the private and
public papers of General Marshall
housed at the Virginia Military Institute’s Marshall Foundation, and the
Preston Library.
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Husted has chosen well in selecting
Marshall to exemplify leadership during
trying and difficult times. No leader
better encapsulated moral and ethical
leadership than George C. Marshall. In
the words of General Colin Powell, “We
have so much to learn from Marshall—
from his character, from his courage,
his compassion, and his commitment to
our nation and to all humankind.”
Using Marshall’s career as a foundation
to examine contemporary leadership,
Husted cites numerous “untold stories”
that not only are entertaining reading
but also serve as “tried-and-true examples of how today’s leaders of government, the military, and business can
demonstrate character, competence and
skill.” Rubrics of Leadership addresses
such diverse topics as managing and
planning the impossible, turning crisis
into success, dealing with communications, and conflict resolution and
negotiation.
By far the most interesting chapter is that
on civil-military relations. Husted examines Marshall’s contributions over a period of two decades and provides valuable
insight into his subject’s nonpartisan
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approach to complex problems. This
chapter concludes with a call to develop
military and political strategy that demonstrates the importance of nation building
in the aftermath of war—a valuable lesson
to current leaders attempting to cope with
the ongoing global war against terrorism.
On the debit side, Husted’s approach is
frequently choppy and lacks adequate
transitions. Though he provides a list of
Marshall’s salient leadership principles
throughout the text, a concluding paragraph summarizing each section’s salient
points would have greatly enhanced the
overall text. So too would an introductory chapter outlining the broad context of the areas on which the author
concentrates.
These observations aside, Husted has
produced a valuable leadership primer
that will be well received by military officers, regardless of rank or position. As
do the military’s senior service colleges,
Rubrics of Leadership urges understanding of the importance of positive relationships with civilians at all levels of
government and business. It is here that
Husted makes his greatest contribution.
COLE C. KINGSEED

Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)
New Windsor, New York

Toll, Ian. The Six Frigates: The Epic History of the
Founding of the U.S. Navy. New York: W. W.
Norton, 2006. 592pp. $27.95

Many books have been written about
the history of the American navy, but
this one is of particular excellence.
While truly a scholarly work, this book
contains many attributes of a historical
novel. Any reader with an interest in
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either the U.S. Navy or early American
history will find it hard to put down.
Toll begins his story with a review of
the Continental navy and its limited
value during the American Revolution,
then moves seamlessly into the postrevolutionary period. America’s colonial
experience and the needs of the newly
formed nation had a direct effect on the
founding of a navy. Pro-navy views were
largely tied to the merchant interests of
the north, championed by leaders such
as John Adams and Alexander Hamilton.
The foes of a naval force were essentially
southern based and included James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who favored domestic development, westward
expansion, and agrarian interests.
In March 1794, these political and economic interests were rooted deeply in
the American experience, and were the
seeds of an acrimonious debate in Congress that preceded House and Senate
authorization for the construction of
six frigates to keep the sea-lanes safe for
America’s large merchant fleet. They
were originally designated merely as
frigates A through F. The first five
names—United States, President, Congress, Constitution, and Constellation—
were chosen by George Washington
from a list of alternatives suggested by
the War Office; subsequently, the Chesapeake was named.
The debate over the question of who
would design the ships began in the
wake of the authorization to build them.
The nation’s most respected ship designers, Joshua Humphreys and Josiah Fox,
clashed over the most desirable warship
design, with Humphreys being the victor. In the end, the six frigates emerged
as the most powerful of their type in the
world, equipped to serve as the nation’s
first blue-water force.
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The first trial by combat of the new
navy was against the French in the undeclared “Quasi-War” of 1797–1800,
which was fought to protect American
merchant shipping. The next naval action occurred in the Mediterranean
during 1803–1805, when war was
waged against the pirates of Tripoli.
However, the true test for the Navy, of
course, occurred during the War of
1812, when the value of the ships and
their crews was proved beyond doubt.
The author’s descriptions of the ships,
their handling, and the combat actions
is excellent, and his portrayal of the
people is equally impressive. The positive and negative characteristics of the
civilian leaders—including John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison—
as well as of the naval officers who became well known in American history
(Stephen Decatur, William Bainbridge,
Thomas Truxtun, Edward Preble, and
James Lawrence) are all examined.
This is Ian Toll’s first book. It is a product of his sailing experience, interest in
the period, writing skill, and thorough
research. The result is an excellent work
that should become a permanent part
of the library of anyone with an interest
in American naval history.
JACK A. GOTTSCHALK

Livingston, New Jersey

O’Rourke, Ronald. The Impact of Chinese Naval
Modernization and the Future of the United
States Navy. New York: Nova, 2006. 106pp. $79

Well written, succinct, and timely, this
balanced assessment of Chinese naval
weaknesses and strengths offers specific
technological development and procurement alternatives to inform
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Washington’s decision making. O’Rourke
is a naval issues analyst for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. Specialists will want
to consult his related product, China
Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background
and Issues for Congress. First published
in November 2006, the latter report has
been updated regularly. Each report
contains details that the other does not.
Like its CRS counterpart, O’Rourke’s
present study draws on a variety of U.S.
government analyses; congressional testimony; and articles from the media,
think tanks, and academia. Additional
details are provided in an appendix.
Charged with presenting different
points of view, with an emphasis on official analyses, O’Rourke cannot be held
responsible for disagreements concerning the underlying assumptions or conclusions of his sources. It should also be
emphasized that Beijing’s continuing
reluctance to offer detailed information
on the purpose or scope of many aspects of its rapid military development
both raises concerns in Washington and
makes it difficult for policy makers
there to rule out worst-case scenarios.
O’Rourke has explicitly chosen to focus
his report by limiting the attention paid
to such issues of potential relevance to
the U.S. Navy as China’s aerospace development. In light of recent significant
Chinese achievements in this realm (including the acknowledged testing of an
antisatellite weapon on 11 January
2007), however, such factors should
perhaps be integrated into follow-on
studies by O’Rourke and his colleagues.
After all, China’s ability to project naval
power farther from its shores will hinge
on developing effective air defense for
surface assets. Certain military
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scenarios, such as those involving Taiwan, might motivate China to attempt
to deter American intervention by the
threat of nuclear strikes or damage to
U.S. space assets.
O’Rourke’s study raises important questions as the United States develops a new
maritime strategy. If preventing Taiwan
independence and promoting reunification is the present focus of China’s naval
development, what other national interests might fuel such development in the
future? What is the proper balance for
the U.S. Navy between supporting operations in the global war on terror and
maintaining (if not increasing) its presence and operational capabilities in the
vast, strategically vital Asia-Pacific region? What resources will be required
to meet the latter requirements, and
how should they be allocated? Finally,
what fleet and basing architecture can
best accomplish this at sustainable cost
to taxpayers?
Critical procurement decisions with
ramifications for years to come are being made in Beijing as China develops a
new five-year plan. As this dual strategic crossroads looms ever larger, it is to
be hoped that the two Pacific powers
can reach an understanding about their
respective regional roles and thereby
keep competitive coexistence from degenerating into a new cold war.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

Naval War College

Wortzel, Larry M. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control,
and Campaign Planning. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.:
U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007. 51pp.
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In China’s Nuclear Forces Larry Wortzel
has delivered an exceptional monograph that demands the attention of
both nuclear strategists and China experts. The author, a leading authority
on China, Asia, national security, and
military strategy, is currently serving as
a commissioner on the congressionally
mandated U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission. He previously served as the director of the Asian
Studies Center and vice president for
foreign policy at the Heritage Foundation. Wortzel’s distinguished thirtytwo-year career in the U.S. armed
forces, during which time he served as
both assistant Army attaché and then
attaché at the American embassy in
China, culminated with an assignment
as director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College.
The title of this monograph promises
an expansive scope, and Wortzel delivers quite ably. While the scale of the
work is extremely helpful in keeping the
various aspects and issues in perspective, the most important new contributions to understanding the evolving
Chinese nuclear posture are Wortzel’s
treatments of “no first use” and nuclear
command and control. As stated by the
author, “The major insights . . . come
from exploiting sections of . . . A Guide
to the Study of Campaign Theory[,] . . .
an unclassified ‘study guide’ for PLA officers on how to understand and apply
doctrine.” These insights, however,
which Wortzel so adeptly lays forth, are
corroborated in other reliable Chineselanguage material.
It has become conventional wisdom
among China scholars to take Chinese
declaratory policy of “no first use” of
nuclear weapons at face value, excusing
away various past unofficial statements
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suggesting that “no first use” ought not
to be taken quite so literally. Wortzel
offers a counterbalance to this view,
elucidating both the concept of preemptive counterattack and the current
debate within China on the viability
and utility of adherence to “no first
use.” His conclusion on this crucial issue is that the debate within China on
“no first use” is real, that a new generation of officers, diplomats, and scholars
leans significantly toward modifying or
jettisoning such a declaratory policy. In
fact, this conclusion is quite in accord
with the one developed and briefed by
the Mahan Scholars student research
team at the Naval War College in the
spring of 2007.
Regarding nuclear command and control, Wortzel finds that the originator of
valid firing orders for the Second Artillery is the Central Military Commission
(CMC), “the highest and most centralized level of military leadership in the
Chinese Communist Party.” While we
would agree that tongshuaibu, or “supreme command,” probably refers to
the CMC in the context of nuclear release authority, this is not completely
clear, and explicit phraseology to bolster that conception was uncomfortably
dropped from defense white papers of
2004 to 2006. Furthermore, in other
writings it appears that conventionalmissile firing authority during conflict
is certainly delegated downward, to the
Second Artillery itself. Such delegation
is, of course, to be expected, but in a
conflict that involved the movement of
nuclear forces and became intense, the
concomitant risks of unauthorized or
inadvertent nuclear missile launch
would grow alarmingly.
In addition to solid scholarship regarding the question of “no first use” and
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nuclear command and control, this
monograph offers substantial original
material on missile-force readiness levels, survivability issues, and targeting.
Overall, as expected from an academician
of Wortzel’s caliber, this work expands
our understanding of the Chinese nuclear posture. As such, it demands the
attention of all China specialists and
nuclear strategists.
CHRISTOPHER YEAW

Naval War College

Sawyer, Ralph D. The Tao of Deception: Unorthodox Warfare in Historic and Modern China.
New York: Basic Books, 2007. 489pp. $29.95

Ralph D. Sawyer, noted scholar of Chinese strategic thought, has produced an
enlightening study of the beginnings and
the evolution of deception in Chinese
political and military history. Contrary
to some contemporary commentators,
China has a long martial tradition.
Warrior leaders and military heroes
permeate both historic and contemporary Chinese literature, as well as modern movies. Deception has long been an
integral part of Chinese warfare. Drawing on the classic works of Chinese military thought, Sawyer demonstrates that
deceptive practices and unorthodox approaches are the norm rather than the
exception. Deception is a fundamental
tenet of Chinese strategic culture, one
that permeates strategic thinking not
only in the military realm but also in
the diplomatic, information, political,
and economic spheres. (Readers of
Sawyer’s previous work, The Tao of
Spycraft, reviewed in the Winter 2007
issue of this journal, will recall that
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Chinese states were using “all elements of
national power” several millennia ago.)
The reader can conclude from this work
that Chinese military thought places deception on an equal level with fire and
maneuver. In this it differs from Western
military thought, which fundamentally
considers deception as “unsportsmanlike” and relegates it to the operational
and intellectual fringes. Deception and
unorthodox approaches afford ways for
the inferior to defeat the superior force.
The “stronger” force, as judged by conventional military standards, is not necessarily more likely to win in battle.
Rather, the force that applies the orthodox and the unorthodox in a way that
fits the situation better is more likely to
prevail. The book abounds with examples of how a little deception or unconventional application can have a great
effect on outcomes.
The relationship between military operations and statecraft is another fundamental thread through this book.
Subversion of an enemy state begins
well before military conflict, and ideally
it makes conflict unneeded. Bribery, assassination (both physical and character), dissension, and distraction are all
basic tools of statecraft, as well as of war.
Fundamentally, Chinese thought makes
no real distinction between the two.
The final chapters address the ongoing
renaissance of traditional Chinese military thought in the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA). The once-despised classic
works are now widely used in PLA
institutions.
Several years ago, two PLA officers published a book, Unrestricted Warfare,
that describes unconventional approaches for defeating a superior force.
In light of Sawyer’s new work, Western
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scholars should reinterpret Unrestricted
Warfare. Rather than being an exception to PLA military thought, it may
well reflect current, core thinking.
Sawyer argues that “China has a lengthy
heritage of conceiving and implementing systemic programs for subverting
other states.” It would be interesting for
scholars of contemporary Chinese diplomacy to compare the “active measures” stratagems outlined in the book
against current U.S.-China events.
This book reads well. A dynastic chronology helps place the events in historical (Chinese, if not world) context.
However, maps would have greatly assisted understanding.
JOHN R. ARPIN

Major, U.S. Army Reserve (Retired)
Centreville, Virginia

Shirk, Susan. China, Fragile Superpower: How
China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful
Rise. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007.
336pp. $27

According to Susan Shirk, China suffers
terribly from the “wag the dog” syndrome. Shirk argues rather persuasively
that China is saddled with a host of internal problems, ranging from widespread social unrest to rampant political
corruption, that have sharply intensified insecurities among Chinese leaders
with respect to their hold on power.
Such perceptions of vulnerability have
in turn heightened Chinese sensitivities
to slights by Japan, Taiwan, and the
United States, slights that accordingly
threaten to arouse potentially uncontrollable national passions and, in the
process, stimulate regime-toppling impulses at home. For Shirk, this volatile
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nexus of domestic and foreign pressures
means trouble for regional stability in
Asia. As Chinese citizens increasingly
scrutinize Beijing’s relations with the
outside world, the Chinese Communist
Party can ill afford to look soft on
hot-button foreign policy questions.
The party’s obsession with internal stability thus compels Beijing to guard vigilantly against foreign insults to China’s
national honor—a critical source of the
regime’s legitimacy. Consequently,
more than ever before, Beijing is
primed to overreact to external crises
and trigger confrontations that might
otherwise have been averted by more
temperate responses.
Overall, Shirk makes a compelling case
about this peculiar dilemma that
Beijing confronts. Although the proposition that the international community
ought to be more concerned about
China’s weaknesses rather than its
strengths is not new, her coverage of its
domestic challenges is quite informative. In particular, Shirk provides a useful framework for understanding
Beijing’s internal priorities—leadership
unity, social harmony, and tight control
of the military—that would be instantly
recognizable to those familiar with
Clausewitz’s famous “paradoxical trinity.” The analysis of China’s prickly ties
with Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States, however, covers well-trodden
ground, material that has been widely
documented in other studies.
As a former deputy assistant secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Shirk writes with authority on
U.S. diplomatic encounters with the
Chinese during the Clinton administration. Her extensive interviews with Chinese policy makers, senior military
officers, scholars, students, and “netizens”
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not only attest to the unusual degree of
access she has accumulated during her
tenure but enliven the narrative with
fascinating vignettes.
Nevertheless, this study is hobbled by
an apparent reluctance to revisit basic
assumptions about the regime itself,
which, after all, the author contends, is
fragile. Shirk does not render crucial
judgments about the viability of
China’s regime-sustaining strategies,
vaguely observing that “[Beijing] may
be capable of surviving for years to
come so long as the economy continues
to grow and create jobs.” Thus the validity of the book’s findings rests almost
entirely on the premise that the Chinese
Communist Party in its current form
will endure indefinitely. The analytical
consequences of this unwillingness to
explore alternative futures are evident
from the author’s boilerplate policy
prescriptions for the United States, including an injunction that Washington
must live with China’s repressive domestic policies.
But what if Shirk’s cautious optimism
about the regime’s longevity is wrong?
This unsettling question awaits another
forward-thinking China watcher.
TOSHI YOSHIHARA

Forest Hills, New York

Alexander, Yonah, ed. Counterterrorism Strategies:
Successes and Failures of Six Nations. Dulles, Va.:
Potomac Books, 2006. 283pp. $24
Zimmermann, Doron, and Andreas Wenger,
eds. How States Fight Terrorism: Policy Dynamics
in the West. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
2006. 269pp. $55

Since the attacks of 11 September, a
kind of conventional wisdom about
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counterterrorism has emerged. On one
hand, the “new terrorism” involves the
violent expression of a radical religious
agenda, suicide attackers, and masscasualty violence. It is, therefore, both
harder to deter and more destructive
than the old ideological and ethnonationalist varieties of terrorism, whose
practitioners, in Brian Michael Jenkins’s
now classic (and obsolete) formulation,
wanted a lot of people watching, not a
lot of people dead. On the other hand,
the takedown, led by the United States,
of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
forced the operational core of al-Qa‘ida
to disperse and the transnational terrorism network to become even more flat
and decentralized. This meant that operational initiative was increasingly left
to local “upstart” cells, which, though
perhaps aided by al-Qa‘ida middlemen,
were merely inspired rather than directed by the central leadership.
The upshot is that the new foot soldiers
of the global jihad may be motivated
less by the cultural humiliation of Islam
at the hands of the West or Osama Bin
Laden’s redemptive grand vision of a
global caliphate than by local or regional social conditions, onto which
they simply graft that ideal and thereby
generate greater energy, purpose, and
focus. In Europe, the main culprits may
be the political and economic marginalization of Muslims in their host countries and their bitter memories of
colonial abuses. In the Middle East, the
gravamen of the radical Muslim complaint could be the plight of the Palestinians or the perceived co-optation of
Arab regimes by the United States and
other Western powers. In the Philippines, it might be the refusal of the state
to accord Muslims political parity and a
measure of autonomy.
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In accord with these views, the perception has evolved among counterterrorism experts that containing the Islamist
terrorist movement requires disaggregating it into regional and sometimes
local elements and devising customized
policies to deal with them. Effective
policies will inevitably entail direct applications of soft as well as hard power—
in particular, conflict resolution and
state building. Also, successful applications of soft power are likely to have a
more positive effect on Muslim perceptions of non-Muslim governments than
are exercises of hard power. Two new
edited volumes of essays, Yonah Alexander’s Counterterrorism Strategies and
Doron Zimmermann and Andreas
Wenger’s How States Fight Terrorism,
approach the challenge of terrorism in
the post-9/11 world on a state-by-state
basis. In doing so, they appear to certify
this evolving view, and with it the corollary that although the global jihadist
movement is in many ways transnational
and virtual, it admits of no holistic solution. Even if there was, one might add,
existing multilateral and supranational
organizations would be incapable of
implementing it.
Alexander’s book is a workmanlike
and highly competent compendium of
substantially descriptive historical case
studies of counterterrorism approaches
in the United States, selected European
countries (France, Germany, and Italy), one Arab state (Egypt), and Sri
Lanka, bracketed by the editor’s introduction and summary with conclusions. Those conclusions are perhaps
the probative elements of the volume,
as Alexander in them attempts to distill from the case studies a range of
constructive counterterrorism policies.
But the proffered list tends either to
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state the obvious (“prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
to rogue states and terrorist groups”)
or confirm admonitions that have already been made in abundance (“increase cooperative relationships and
alliances with like-minded nations”).
Furthermore, probably because Alexander’s study was initiated in 1998—
that is, before 9/11—the choice of case
studies is arguably misaimed. Egypt’s
pre-9/11 experience is relevant precisely because it is a formative aspect
of the transnationalization of Islamist
terrorism and the rise of al-Qa‘ida,
and the Tamil Tigers’ activity in Sri
Lanka is worthy of study also because
of their persistence and innovation
(for instance, suicide attacks). However, one key European state, from a
counterterrorism standpoint—the
United Kingdom—is completely
excluded.
Zimmermann and Wenger’s book, unlike Alexander’s, was undertaken at the
specific prompting of the 9/11 attacks
and jihadist terrorism. It constitutes a
more incisive and structurally oriented
look at issues and challenges, namely,
those peculiar to counterterrorism in
the post-9/11 epoch. Indeed, following
a trenchant introduction outlining the
contemporary challenge, the first chapter, by Laura K. Donahue, deals comprehensively with the United Kingdom,
aptly summing up the British dispensation as having “not been a radical departure from the previous state of
affairs but rather an acceleration of the
state’s counterterrorist strategy.” This
volume also contains chapters on countries like Norway that have had little
counterterrorism experience and those
like Canada whose security policies are
overdetermined by strong and
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prominent neighbors. Given the wide
transnational presence of the global
jihadist movement and the potential
problems it poses to states heretofore
untouched by (or at least insulated
from) terrorism, the inclusion of such
states seems wise. The chapter on the
United States by RAND analyst William
Rosenau is nuanced and marked by
calm pragmatism. Rosenau stresses that
even transnational Islamist terrorism as
perpetrated by al-Qa‘ida does not qualify as an existential threat to the United
States and intimates that treating it as
such could unduly skew national priorities—and may already have done so.
Martin van Creveld’s fine but largely
historical treatment appears at first
blush to be something of a non sequitur, but it may have been included to illustrate (as it does) the attritional
effects that a long-term terrorist campaign can have on a modern state and
military in the absence of political
resolution.
Rohan Gunaratna’s thorough but familiar assessment, entitled “Combating
Al-Qaida and Associated Groups,”
counsels that “governments should
move from traditional cooperation to
collaboration,” if the global network is
to be neutralized. It characterizes the
war in Iraq as counterproductively antagonistic to radical Muslims and suggests that regional conflicts will have to
be ameliorated to tame them. Such recommendations, while generally sensible,
may get ahead of the other material in
the book. However, the editors’ excellent
concluding essay nicely grounds the volume by casting the central counterterrorism task as striking a “balance . . .
between the efficiency of the legal, political, civilian and military means used
to combat terrorism, on the one hand,
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and their legitimacy in the eyes of the
affected constituencies, on the other.”
Overall, the two books do an estimable
job of delineating programmatically
what states seeking to counter terrorism
can and need to do. In so doing, they
also invite more specific and granular
analyses of precisely how to do it.

to electric shock and water boarding.
He was even administered Pentothal, or
“truth serum.” Despite these outrages,
Alleg refused to break, earning him
both wrath and grudging respect from
his tormentors. He escaped from prison
in October 1961, just months before the
war ended.

JONATHAN STEVENSON

Fifty years later, Alleg’s voice remains as
reasoned and penetrating as ever. He laments that France’s political elite have
attempted to purge the Algerian War
and its attendant horrors from the
country’s official memory; many military men responsible for these crimes,
he notes, have received not only amnesty but promotion and praise. Only
in 2000 did the French government admit that it had perpetrated widespread
torture and other abuses during this period. Ironically, one former torturer
proudly admitted to his actions in a
2001 book, causing such a backlash that
he was punished, albeit lightly. However, Alleg insists that even this slap on
the wrist signals a shift in official
French thinking.

Naval War College

Alleg, Henri. The Question. Lincoln: Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 2006. 74pp. $16.95

During France’s Algerian War (1954–
62), the French journalist Henri Alleg
sided with the insurgents. Arrested by
French authorities in June 1957, Alleg
was detained and tortured. During his
confinement he managed to write and
smuggle out an account of his experiences. Originally published in 1958,
The Question was quickly banned by
the French government, the first such
action France had taken since the eighteenth century. The book nonetheless
became a sensation.
Reissued after half a century, this new
edition retains its preface by French
novelist and philosopher Jean-Paul
Sartre, now supplemented with a foreword by author Ellen Ray, an introduction by author James D. Le Sueur, and a
new afterword by Alleg himself.
The book’s title euphemistically refers
to torture. In calm and lucid prose,
Alleg describes his fate at the hands of
his captors. Held for a month in Algeria’s El Biar prison, Alleg was tortured
by French paras (paratroopers) before
being transferred to another prison,
where he composed The Question. His
“interrogations” ranged from beatings
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The accompanying essays deserve mention. Ray minces no words, accusing
the United States of pursuing a “strategy that incorporates racism, torture,
and murder” in its current conflicts.
Seeing America as headed down a moral
slippery slope, she wonders if it might go
the way of the French Fourth Republic
or whether “Americans might be the defendants in future war crimes trials.”
Le Sueur provides background on
Alleg’s experiences and the debate that
The Question aroused in France. He argues that present-day France has yet to
come to grips with its sordid conduct.
In fact, the French parliament passed a
law in February 2005 enjoining educators to teach the “positive role” of
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French imperialism and to recognize
the “sacrifices” made by France’s armed
forces in the Algerian War.
Sartre is biting in his psychological dissection of both torturer and victim. He
maintains that torture stems from racial
hatred and that only by believing an individual to be less than human can one
justify torture.
We should be grateful for this timely
republication of The Question, as it reminds France of a chapter in its history
it has tried hard to forget. It is also evidence that fighting terrorists by sacrificing one’s humanity ensures not just a
long war but an endless one.
MICHAEL H. CRESWELL

Florida State University

Evans, Michael. The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901–
2005. Duntroon, ACT, Australia: Land Warfare
Studies Centre, 2005. Available online at www.
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In this excellent monograph, Michael
Evans argues that Australia has a distinctive way of war that focuses on continental defensive strategies. These
strategies, for most of its history, have
been abandoned by statesmen upholding Australia’s extended vital interests
in a favorable regional and world order.
In other words, Australian military
strategists instinctively think about
homeland defense, especially of the air
and sea-lanes connecting Australia to
the world, but their political leaders inevitably require them to adapt their
strategies to intervening around the
world as a member of coalitions of
like-minded liberal democracies. In the
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United States, we call this a “policystrategy mismatch,” but Evans calls it
the “tyranny of dissonance,” with the
interventionist tradition of Australian
foreign policy pulling one way and the
more isolationist official Australian
military strategy pulling another. In
that respect, Australia resembles Britain
and the United States, which have also
been torn between “splendid isolation”
and foreign intervention in different
periods of their histories.
Evans is as relentless as a fly at a picnic
in the Australian outback in demonstrating his thesis, which makes his style
sometimes just as annoying. He might
have limited his analysis to a few archetypal case studies and so made his point
with greater power in fewer words. He
does prove, however, that both the geographical position and unique political
culture of Australia have inclined its
military leaders to treat their continent
as an Anglo-Saxon island in the middle
of Asia, one that needed to be isolated
from the rough-and-tumble of regional
and global conflicts. Time and again,
however, Australia’s dependence on
great powers (first Britain, then the
United States), as well as the broader vision of Australian political leaders,
compelled it to adopt a coalition strategy of “limited liability.” Both to avoid
overextension and to demonstrate their
bona fides to Australia’s allies, statesmen “down under” have consistently
made limited commitments to imperial,
later international, security in World
War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam,
the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Like more unilateral interventions in
East Timor and the Solomon Islands,
these expeditions demonstrate that official Australian defense strategy is often
out of sync with Australian foreign
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policy. More precisely, these trends
show that official strategy will probably
have to be abandoned again, so Australians will have to develop the expeditionary means to back up their
interventionist interests.
So, what are the Australians to do about
this tension between their cultural instincts and their strategic necessities?
Evans, who served as a major in the
Zimbabwean army before emigrating to
Australia, is hopeful that Australia’s
gradual shift from its “white only” culture of the early twentieth century to a
more pluralistic society in the
twenty-first century will increase the
growing tendency of Australians to see
themselves as stakeholders in both the
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international system and the regional
balance of power in the Pacific and
Asia. Echoing contemporary American
misgivings about poor interagency cooperation in the United States, Evans
also calls for what he refers to as the
“whole government approach” that
matches Australian foreign policy and
defense strategy, so neither is formed in
a vacuum. Australians would still make
limited-liability investments in foreign
interventions but would have a better
chance to develop strategies and force
structures suited to their extended interests in a liberal world order.
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